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Abstract
The protability of remanufacturing depends on the quantity and quality of product
returns and on the demand for remanufactured products. The quantity and quality
of product returns can be inuenced by varying quality dependent acquisition prices,
i.e., by using product acquisition management. Demand can be inuenced by varying
the selling price. We develop a framework for determining the optimal prices and the
corresponding protability.
1 Introduction
In recoverable product environments, products are reused rather than being discarded. Prod-
uct recovery options include value-added recovery (remanufacturing), material recovery (re-
cycling), and energy recovery (incineration). Product recovery reduces the requirements for
virgin materials, energy consumption, and landll space. Perhaps most importantly, from
a business perspective, these systems can signicantly contribute to the overall protability
of the rm. Lund (1998) reports that there are over 70,000 remanufacturing rms in the
US with total sales of $53 billion (USD). These rms directly employ 350,000 workers and
average prot margins exceed 20% (Nasr et al. 1998).
No matter what type of product recovery option is practiced, the rm must obtain used
products to serve as inputs to the recovery system. Guide and VanWassenhove (2000) discuss
the implications of product acquisition management systems and describe two alternatives
for product recovery. We will focus on the market-driven recovery system and develop an
economic analysis for calculating the optimal (prot maximizing) price incentives for product
returns and the optimal selling price for remanufactured products.
In the sections that follow, we discuss the economics of product recovery and present a
case documenting the product recovery problem at a rm remanufacturing consumer elec-
tronics goods. We then present the economic model and a practical strategy for solving the
problem.
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2 The economics of product recovery
Guide and Van Wassenhove (2000) remark that, surprisingly, there is no literature on the
economic analysis of the potential protability of product recovery (see Guide 2000 and
Fleischmann 2000 for comprehensive literature reviews). They develop a framework for ana-
lyzing the protability of product remanufacturing. An important aspect of their framework
is the ability of a remanufacturing rm to inuence quality, quantity, and timing of product
returns by oering users a quality dependent price incentive for turning in products. Empir-
ical evidence shows that a number of remanufacturing rms in the US. have adopted such a
market-driven product acquisition management approach (Guide 2000).
European rms, on the other hand, seem to rely on the waste stream for acquiring
recoverable products. Firms using this approach passively accept all product returns. They
are not involved in product recovery for economic reasons, but because of environmental
legislation. Many of the rms operating under a waste stream approach consider their
product recovery system to be a cost center rather than a prot center. Their objective
is to minimize the costs associated with a product recovery system, rather than maximize
the prot. Returned products in the waste-stream tend to be old and have a poor quality,
and as a consequence, the recovery options for these products are often limited. Oering
price incentives might be more protable for a rm, if it leads to more high quality, low age
returns.
The framework provided by Guide and Van Wassenhove (2000) is very general and pro-
vides a number of insights. Many dierent aspects of a product recovery system are aected
by choices in product acquisition management. Some of the aspects considered are: system
characteristics (machine utilization rates, process lead times, work in process), revenues and
costs (material, labor, acquisition price, disposal), and assets (inventory, machines, build-
ings) and liabilities (trade payables, accrued expenses). The discussion is in general terms,
and not expressed in functional relationships. Therefore, their framework cannot be used
directly for calculating optimal price incentives. The framework is a motivation for the
analysis developed here. In the next section we present a case study of product acquisition
management.
3 Product acquisition management
We present the specics of product acquisition management at a rm that recovers mobile
cellular telephone handsets and accessories. ReCellular, Inc., was founded in 1991 in Ann
Arbor, MI by Charles Newman to trade new, used, and remanufactured cellular handsets.
The company oers remanufactured and graded as-is products as a high quality, cost eec-
tive alternative to new cellular handsets. Customer services include: grading and sorting,
remanufacturing, logistics, trading, and product sourcing (all services are specic to cellu-
lar handsets and accessories). Grading the handsets is based on functional and cosmetic
criteria. Handsets may be slated for remanufacturing, where they are restored to like new
standards with respect to quality and cosmetic appearance. Remanufacturing is mainly lim-
ited to replacement of parts that have been damaged (e.g., scratched faceplates) or broken
(e.g., antena). Handsets sold as-is are guaranteed to meet predetermined nominal quality
standards ReCellular operates globally, buying and selling in markets around the world.
The cellular communications industry is a highly dynamic market where the demand for
telephones changes daily. Demand may be inuenced by the introduction of new technology
(e.g., digital and analog), price changes in cellular airtime, promotional campaigns, the open-
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ing of new markets, churn (customers leaving present airtime providers), and the number of
new cellular telephones manufactured. Additionally, there is no worldwide standard tech-
nology (e.g., Europe and the United States both use GSM, but at dierent bandwidths) and
this necessitates dealing in a number of often disparate technologies and standards. These
global dierences make regional activities diÆcult since there may be no local market for
certain types/models of phones, requiring a rm to manage global sales and procurement.
Additionally, cellular airtime providers may limit the number of telephones supported by
their system and the dropping of a phone model by a major carrier can greatly aect a local
market.
A company oering used or remanufactured equipment faces numerous factors aecting
the supply of used cellular phones. The same factors that complicate demand aect the
availability of used handsets. The supply of used handsets is a volatile market, with volumes
and prices in a constant state of ux.
The acquisition of used telephones is central to the success of a remanufacturing rm.
The nature of product acquisitions is driven by what future demands (unknown) will be for
phones. The lead times for delivery after used phones have been purchased are often lengthy
and may be subject to large amount of variability. This has caused remanufacturers to have
stocks of used phones on-hand to compete for sales.
ReCellular obtains used phones in bulk from a variety of sources, including cellular airtime
providers and third-party collectors. Third-party collectors are often charitable foundations
that act as consolidators by collecting used handsets and accessories from individuals. Cellu-
lar airtime providers also act as consolidators by collecting used phones from customers who
have returned the phones at the end of service agreements, or customers upgrading to newer
technology (cellular airtime providers are often buyers of the remanufactured products).
Both these and other sources worldwide may oer a variety of handsets and accessories
in varying condition for a wide range of prices and quantities. Due to the low cost (ap-
proximately $0.50 per phone using air transport) of bulk transportation of phones, using a
worldwide network of suppliers of used phones is practical and cost-eÆcient. No individual
returns are accepted since the channels required for direct returns from the consumer have
too high a cost to be eective at this time.
Obtaining the best grade of used products for the best price is one of the key tasks
necessary for the success of ReCellular. Deciding on a fair price to oer for the used phones is
a diÆcult and complex task. Present state-of the-art is based primarily on expert judgement,
which is acquired by trial and error.
The value of a used handset is highly dependant on future market demand for that
particular model either in remanufactured or as-is form. The present demand for a graded
as-is used cellular phone or a remanufactured phone is known for that instant in time, but
due to the highly dynamic nature of the industry, these prices are not stable. The market
forces discussed earlier may cause the value of a particular model of phone to drop or rise
with little warning. An additional factor is that the selling price for remanufactured phones
tends to drop over time, making the used phones a perishable product.
In the following section we describe a simple model to aid a decision maker in deciding
how many used products to acquire and what to pay for them.
4 The economic model
In the sections that follow, we develop a simple economic mode, based on operations at
ReCellular. However, we believe that the operations at ReCellular are representative of
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problems faced by remanufacturing rms in general. For the sake of simplicity and clarity
we list the assumptions, in Table 1 below, required by our base model. We will justify these
assumptions in the following sections.
A1 Perfect testing
A2 There exist a few, mutually exclusive, quality classes
A3 No capacity constraints
A4 No xed costs
A5 Return rates are independent of sales rates
A6 The system is operating in steady state
A7 The model is for a single period only and not dependent on the product life cycle
A8 There are no supply or demand constraints
Table 1: Assumptions
There are N quality classes, numbered 1; 2; :::; N , for returned products. These classes
dier, for example, in preliminary testing results, physical damage and appearance. As
a consequence, the classes have dierent associated expected remanufacturing costs. We
assume that within a certain quality class, all returned products have the same associated
expected remanufacturing cost. Note that this does not imply that testing is perfect or that
the classes are non-overlapping in quality or in remanufacturing cost. We only assume that
the expected remanufacturing cost for a returned product that falls into quality class i is
known, and denote it by c
i
; i = 1; 2; :::; N . For ease of notation, we will refer to a product
return that falls into quality class i as a return of type i in the remainder of this paper.
To stimulate returns, price incentives are oered. The acquisition price for a return of
type i; i = 1; 2; :::; N; is denoted by a
i
, and r
i
(a
i
) denotes the corresponding return rate
(function). We assume that r
i
(a
i
) is continuous, increasing, and twice dierentiable. It is
dened on [
i
;1) and starts at zero, that is, r
i
(
i
) = 0. We remark that 
i
can be both
negative and positive. High quality returns can only be expected if a positive acquisition
price is oered (
i
> 0). But for low quality product returns, especially products that
contain toxic materials, users might be willing to pay a disposal fee (
i
< 0). We order the
classes in such a way (not necessarily unique) that 
1
+ c
1
 
2
+ c
2
 :::  
N
+ c
N
. This
will turn out to be convenient in the analysis that follows. The rst and second derivative
of r
i
(a
i
) are denoted by r
0
i
(a
i
) and r
00
i
(a
i
) respectively.
Our modelling of the returns implies independence of the return rates. That is, the
acquisition price in one class does not inuence the return rates in other classes. In cases like
that of ReCellular, where used products are obtained in bulk from a number of collecting
sources, this assumption is justied. Those sources will sell their on-hand stock of used
products of a certain quality to the highest bidder, i.e., to the bidder that oers the highest
price for products of that quality. The assumption might not be justied in cases where
most used products are obtained from the users themselves, and where many of those users
compare acquisition prices before deciding at which age (and corresponding quality class) to
turn in their product.
Remanufactured products are sold at price p, and d(p) denotes the corresponding demand
rate (function). We assume that d(p) is continuous, decreasing, and twice dierentiable. It
is dened on [
1
+ c
1
; ] and ends at zero, that is, d() = 0. So  can be interpreted as the
maximal price that customers are willing to pay for a remanufactured product. We assume
that  > 
N
+ c
N
, because otherwise one or more types of returns could never be sold at
a protable price. The rst and second derivative of d(p) are denoted by d
0
(p) and d
00
(p)
respectively. We remark that the shape of the demand curve will most of all depend on the
type of market for selling remanufactured products, especially on the number of competing
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rms.
The goal is to determine the combination of a selling price p and acquisition prices
a
i
; i = 1; 2; :::; N; that maximizes the prot rate. Since the return rates are increasing in
the acquisition price and the demand rate is decreasing in the selling price, we can restrict
our attention to pricing strategies for which the demand rate is equal to the total return
rate, i.e., d(p) =
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
). Therefore, we characterize a pricing strategy by the set of
acquisition prices a = fa
1
; :::; a
N
g only and denote it by (a) = (a
1
; :::; a
N
). The selling
price associated with such a strategy is denoted by p(a) = p(a
1
; :::; a
N
). The optimal values
for a
1
; :::; a
N
are denoted by a

1
; :::; a

N
.
Our economic model focuses on a specic point in time, i.e., we assume that the demand
and return rate functions are known. Given those functions, and the remanufacturing costs,
our objective is to determine the selling price and acquisition prices that maximize the prot
rate. Of course, the model can be modied at any time, re-estimating demand and return
rate functions and recalculating the optimal strategy. In fact, the model could be used to
decide when the remanufacturing of a certain product should be initiated and terminated.
We nally remark that this continuous time model can easily be modied to a single
period discrete time model. The functions d(p) and r
i
(a
i
); i = 1; 2; :::; N; then denote the
total demand and return in that period, and the objective is to determine the selling price
and acquisition prices that maximize the total prot.
5 The optimal strategy
Let P (a) denote the prot rate of pricing strategy (a), which can be expressed as
P (a) = p(a)
N
X
i=1
r
i
(a
i
) 
N
X
i=1
(r
i
(a
i
) (a
i
+ c
i
)) ,
and let
@
@a
j
P (a) and
@
2
@a
2
j
P (a) denote the rst and second order partial derivatives of P (a)
with respect to a
j
; j = 1; 2; :::; N . The rst order optimality conditions for a pricing strategy
(a) are
@
@a
j
P (a) = 0 for all j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng such that a
j
> 
j
and (1)
@
@a
j
P (a)  0 for all j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng such that a
j
= 
j
. (2)
The second order optimality conditions are
@
2
@a
2
j
P (a) < 0 for all j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng such that a
j
> 
j
. (3)
Expressions for the rst order and the second order partial derivatives are derived in Ap-
pendix A. Using those expressions, and recalling that r(
j
) = 0 and that
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
) =
d(p(a)), we can rewrite the rst order optimality conditions (1) and (2) as
r
j
(a
j
)
r
0
j
(a
j
)
+ (a
j
+ c
j
) =
d(p(a))
d
0
(p(a))
+ p(a) if a
j
> 
j
and (4)
(a
j
+ c
j
) 
d(p(a))
d
0
(p(a))
+ p(a) if a
j
= 
j
, (5)
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and the second order optimality conditions (3) (assuming that (4) holds) as
2r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
 
d
00
(p(a))r
0
j
(a
j
)d(p(a))
(d
0
(p(a)))
3
+
r
j
(a
j
)r
00
j
(a
j
)

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
< 2 if a
j
> 
j
. (6)
For notational ease we dene
g(p) :=
d(p)
d
0
(p)
+ p (7)
and for all j = 1; :::; N;
f
j
(a
j
) :=
r
j
(a
j
)
r
0
j
(a
j
)
+ (a
j
+ c
j
). (8)
These can be interpreted as the marginal revenue of selling one extra remanufactured product
and the marginal cost of buying one extra used product of type j; j = 1; :::; N . If one extra
product is sold, then the revenue associated with that product is p(a), but the other d(p(a))
products are sold at a  1=d
0
(p(a)) lower price, which gives a total marginal revenue of
g(p(a)). If one extra used product of type j is bought, then the cost associated with that
product is (a
j
+ c
j
), and the other r
j
(a
j
) products of type j are bought at a 1=r
0
j
(a
j
) higher
price, which gives a total marginal cost of f
j
(a
j
).
Using (7) and (8), the rst order optimality conditions (4) and (5) simplify to
f
j
(a
j
) = g(p(a)) if a
j
> 
j
and (9)
f
j
(a
j
)  g(p(a)) if a
j
= 
j
. (10)
Using the above results, the optimal strategy can be determined as follows. First, de-
termine all strategies that satisfy (9) and (10). Then, check which of those strategies also
satisfy (6) and are hence locally optimal. Obviously, at least one locally optimal strategy
has to exist. Finally, compare the prot rates of the locally optimal strategies.
Based on a number of examples, we know that there can be several strategies that satisfy
(9), (10) and (6) if the demand and return rate functions have complex shapes. Furthermore,
those strategies can be diÆcult to determine. But if f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; and g(p) are all
increasing, then there is only one strategy that satises (9), (10) and (6). In fact, there
is only one strategy that satises (9) and (10), as is stated in Lemma 1. Moreover, that
strategy can easily be determined using Theorem 1. The proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem
1 are respectively given in Appendices B and C. Note that f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; and g(p)
are all increasing if (but not only if) r
00
j
(a
j
)  0; j = 1; :::; N; and d
00
(p)  0, that is, if
r
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; and d(p) are all concave.
Lemma 1 If f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; and g(p) are all increasing, then there is only one strategy
that satises (9) and (10). This strategy also satises (6), and is of the type (a
1
; :::; a
M
; 
M+1
; :::; 
N
)
with a
j
> 
j
for j = 1; :::;M , where M 2 f1; :::; Ng.
Theorem 1 If f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; and g(p) are all increasing, then the optimal strategy is
determined by the following procedure.
Step 1: M := 1.
Step 2: h
M
M
(a
M
) := a
M
. If M  2, then express a
j
; j = 1; 2; :::;M   1; as a function
h
M
j
(a
M
) using f
j
(a
j
) = f
M
(a
M
).
Step 3: Using
P
M
i=1
r
i
(h
M
i
(a
M
)) = d

p

h
M
1
(a
M
); :::; h
M
M
(a
M
); 
M+1
; :::; 
N

, nd the
value a

M
for a
M
for which f
M
(a
M
) = g

h
M
1
(a
M
); :::; h
M
M
(a
M
); 
M+1
; :::; 
N

.
Step 4: If either M = N or f
M
(a

M
)  f
M+1
(
M+1
) then the optimal strategy is
(h
M
1
(a

M
); :::; h
M
M
(a

M
); 
M+1
; :::; 
N
). Otherwise, M := M + 1 and repeat steps 2, 3, and 4.
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Remark 1 If r
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::;M; are `simple' functions, for instance rst or second degree
polynomials, then closed-form expressions for h
M
j
(a
M
); j = 1; :::;M   1; are obtained in Step
2. In such a case, Steps 3 and 4 can be done analytically. If it is not possible to obtain
closed-form expressions in Step 2, then Steps 3 and 4 have to be done numerically.
In Example 1, we apply Theorem 1 to determine the optimal strategy for a simple case
with linear (and hence concave) demand and return rate functions.
Example 1 Let N = 3, c
1
= 1, c
2
= 3, c
3
= 6, 
1
= 4, 
2
= 3, 
3
= 2, r
1
(a
1
) = 60(a
1
  4),
r
2
(a
2
) = 40(a
2
  3), r
3
(a
3
) = 100(a
3
  2),  = 10, and d(p) = 1000  100p.
It easily follows that f
1
(a
1
) = 2a
1
  3, f
2
(a
2
) = 2a
2
, and f
3
(a
3
) = 2a
3
+ 4. Applying the
procedure in Theorem 1 gives:
Step 1: M := 1.
Step 2: h
1
1
(a
1
) := a
1
.
Step 3: Using 60(a
1
  4) = 1000   100p(h
1
1
(a
1
); 
2
; 
3
) we get g(h
1
1
(a
1
); 
2
; 
3
) = 10  
0:02 (60(a
1
  4)). So f
1
(a
1
) = g(h
1
1
(a
1
); 
2
; 
3
) becomes 2a
1
  3 = 10  1:2(a
1
  4), which is
solved by a

1
= 5:5625.
Step 4: f
1
(a

1
) = 8:125 > 6 = f
2
(
2
). So M :=M + 1 = 2.
Step 2: h
2
2
(a
2
) := a
2
. Using f
1
(a
1
) = f
2
(a
2
) we get a
1
= h
2
1
(a
2
) := a
2
+ 1:5.
Step 3: Using 60(a
2
 2:5)+40(a
2
 3) = 1000 100p(h
2
1
(a
2
); h
2
2
(a
2
); 
3
) we get g(h
2
1
(a
2
); h
2
2
(a
2
); 
3
) =
10  0:02 (60(a
2
  2:5) + 40(a
2
  3)). So f
2
(a
2
) = g(h
2
1
(a
2
); h
2
2
(a
2
); 
3
) becomes 2a
2
= 10 
2a
2
+ 5:4, which is solved by a

2
= 3:85.
Step 4: f
2
(a

2
) = 7:7 < 8 = f
3
(
3
). So the optimal strategy is (h
2
1
(a

2
); h
2
2
(a

2
); 
3
) =
(5:35; 3:85; 2). The associated selling price is 8:85 and the prot rate is 8:85 (81 + 34)  
81 (5:35 + 1)  34 (3:85 + 3) = 270:5.
As mentioned before, it is complicated to determine the optimal strategy if the demand
and return rate functions have complex shapes. In the next section, we therefore restrict
our attention to a special class of pricing strategies. Within that intuitively appealing class,
the optimal strategy can be determined more easily. Indeed, as we will show, that optimal
strategy can be determined graphically, thereby avoiding the need to express the demand
and return rate functions analytically.
6 A practical strategy
We restrict our attention to strategies (a) with a xed per product prot rate. That is, we
set
a
j
= max (
j
; a
new
  c
j
) ; j = 1; 2; :::; N , (11)
where a
new
denotes the (theoretical) acquisition price that we are willing to pay for an
as-good-as-new returned item that does not require manufacturing. We will denote such
a strategy by 
0
(a
new
), the associated total return rate by R
0
(a
new
), and the associated
selling price (for which the demand rate is equal to the total return rate) by p
0
(a
new
).
Moreover, we will denote the optimal value for a
new
by a

new
. Rewriting (11) as
a
j
+ c
j
= a
new
if a
j
> 
j
and (12)
a
j
+ c
j
 a
new
if a
j
= 
j
, (13)
we observe that a strategy of type 
0
(a
new
) shares some similarities with a strategy that
satises the rst order optimality conditions (4) and (5), but 
0
(a
new
) ignores the shapes
of the demand and return rate functions.
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Since strategies in the restricted class are characterized by a single strategy parameter
a
new
, the optimal strategy in that class is much easier to determine than the overall optimal
strategy. In fact, as we will show in the remainder of this section, the optimal strategy of
type 
0
(a
new
) can be determined graphically.
The total return rate
R
0
(a
new
) =
X
i;
i
+c
i
<a
new
r
i
(a
new
  c
i
)
can graphically be determined by shifting each return curve r
i
(a
i
) for type i returns c
i
units
to the right, and adding the shifted curves. Combining the so obtained total return rate
curve with the demand rate curve, the prot rate

p
0
(a
new
)  a
new

R
0
(a
new
)
of strategy 
0
(a
new
) can be determined graphically. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for
Example 1 of the previous section. Hence, this avoids the need for expressing the demand and
return rate functions analytically, which is an important practical advantage. For Example
1, we did use the analytical expressions to determine the exact optimal strategy. This turned
out to be 
0
(a

new
= 6:55) = (5:55; 3:55; 2). The associated selling price is 8:85 and the
prot rate is 8:85 (93 + 22)   93 (5:55 + 1)   22 (3:55 + 3) = 264:5. Recall that the overall
optimal strategy is (5:35; 3:85; 2) with prot rate 270:5. The acquisition prices and the
corresponding return rates for both strategies are represented graphically in Figure 2.
So for Example 1, strategy 
0
(a

new
) performs quite well. Also in most other cases that
we considered, the prot rate of strategy 
0
(a

new
) did not dier more than a few per cent
from that of the overall optimal strategy (a

1
; :::; a

N
). Exceptions are formed by cases where
the return rate functions are very dierent in shape, that is, if some of those functions are
very steep whereas others are rather at. Since a strategy with a xed per product prot
rate ignores such dierences, this can result in a poor performance of strategy 
0
(a

new
).
This is illustrated in Example 2.
Example 2 Let N = 2, c
1
= 1, c
2
= 0:5, 
1
= 0, 
2
= 1:55,
r
1
(a
1
) =
(
1
2 a
1
  500(0:1  a
1
)
3
if a
1
 0:1
1
2 a
1
if a
1
> 0:1
,
r
2
(a
2
) = 40(a
2
  1:55),  = 3, and
d(p) =
(
1:15  0:05p if p  2:9
1:15  0:05p  1000(p  2:9)
3
if p > 2:9
.
The demand and return rate functions are represented graphically in Figure 3. That
gure also shows the acquisition prices, the selling price, and the corresponding return and
demand rates for the optimal strategies of type 
0
and . These optimal strategies are

0
(a

new
= 1:10) and (a

1
= 0:09; a

2
= 1:562), with prot rates of respectively 0:99 and 1:36.
So strategy 
0
(a

new
) is 27 per cent less protable than the overall optimal strategy. The poor
performance of strategy 
0
(a

new
) is due to its restricted focus on strategies with a xed per
product prot rate. For this example, due to the steepness of r
2
(a
2
), it is much better to use
a lower per product prot rate for class 2 returns.
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7 Conclusions and Future Research
We have provided a rst attempt at viewing remanufacturing as a protable business venture
by positively inuencing the incoming quality of used products. By controlling the quality
of the acquired products that serve as the input to the remanufacturing process, a decision
maker can determine the overall protability of a remanufacturing system. The model we
have developed is a simple treatment restricted to one category of sales. Obviously future
models should examine multiple categories and examine non-linear relationships.
A Partial derivatives of the prot rate P (a)
Recall that the prot rate P (a) of strategy (a) is
P (a) = p(a)
N
X
i=1
r
i
(a
i
) 
N
X
i=1
(r
i
(a
i
) (a
i
+ c
i
)) .
Dierentiating with respect to a
j
gives
@
@a
j
P (a) =
@
@a
j
p(a)
N
X
i=1
(r
i
(a
i
)) + p(a)r
0
j
(a
j
)  r
j
(a
j
)  r
0
j
(a
j
)(a
j
+ c
j
).
It is easy to see that
@
@a
j
p(a) =
r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
(14)
and hence we get
@
@a
j
P (a) =
r
0
j
(a
j
)
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
)
d
0
(p(a))
+ p(a)r
0
j
(a
j
)  r
j
(a
j
)  r
0
j
(a
j
)(a
j
+ c
j
)
= r
0
j
(a
j
)
 
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
)
d
0
(p(a))
+ p(a) 
r
j
(a
j
)
r
0
j
(a
j
)
  (a
j
+ c
j
)
!
.
Dierentiating again with respect to a
j
gives
@
2
@a
2
j
P (a)
= r
00
j
(a
j
)
 
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
)
d
0
(p(a))
+ p(a) 
r
j
(a
j
)
r
0
j
(a
j
)
  (a
j
+ c
j
)
!
+r
0
j
(a
j
)
0
@
r
0
j
(a
j
)d
0
(p(a))  d
00
(p(a))
@
@a
j
p(a)
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
)
(d
0
(p(a)))
2
1
A
+r
0
j
(a
j
)
0
B
@
r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
 

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
  r
j
(a
j
)r
00
j
(a
j
)

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
  1
1
C
A
.
Using (14) this can be rewritten as
@
2
@a
2
j
P (a)
9
= r
00
(a
j
)
 
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
)
d
0
(p(a))
+ p(a) 
r
j
(a
j
)
r
0
j
(a
j
)
  (a
j
+ c
j
)
!
+r
0
j
(a
j
)
0
B
@
2r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
 
d
00
(p(a))r
0
j
(a
j
)
P
N
i=1
r
i
(a
i
)
(d
0
(p(a)))
3
+
r
j
(a
j
)r
00
j
(a
j
)

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
  2
1
C
A
.
B Proof of Lemma 1
We rst proof that there is only one strategy that satises (9) and (10). This is done by
assuming that there are at least two such strategies and then deriving a contradiction. Let
us denote these two strategies by (b) = (b
1
; :::; b
N
) and (c) = (c
1
; :::; c
N
). Without loss
of generality, assume that p(b)  p(c). We will consider the cases p(b) = p(c) and p(b) < p(c)
separately.
p(b) = p(c). Clearly, g(p(b)) = g(p(c)). Because f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; is increasing, (9) and
(10) then imply that b
j
= c
j
for all j = 1; :::; N . But this contradicts the assumption
that (b) and (c) are dierent strategies.
p(b) < p(c). Because g(p) is increasing, we have g(p(b)) < g(p(c)). Using again that f
j
(a
j
); j =
1; :::; N; is increasing, (9) and (10) then imply that b
j
 c
j
for all j = 1; :::; N . Hence
d(p(b)) =
P
N
i=1
r
i
(b
i
) 
P
N
i=1
r
i
(c
i
) = d(p(c)), since r
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; is increasing.
But since d(p) is decreasing, this contradicts the assumption that p(b) < p(c).
We next show that the strategy (a) that satises (9) and (10) always satises (6) also.
Dierentiating g(p(a)) and f
j
(a
j
) with respect to a
j
gives (see (7) and (8))
@
@a
j
g(p(a)) = 2
@
@a
j
p(a) 
d
00
(p(a))
@
@a
j
p(a)d(p(a))
(d
0
(p(a)))
2
(15)
and
f
0
j
(a
j
) =

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
  r
j
(a
j
)r
00
j
(a
j
)

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
+ 1 =  
r
j
(a
j
)r
00
j
(a
j
)

r
0
j
(a
j
)

2
+ 2 (16)
Using (14) we can rewrite (15) as
@
@a
j
g(p(a)) = 2
r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
 
d
00
(p(a))r
0
j
(a
j
)d(p(a))
(d
0
(p(a)))
3
(17)
and we also get
@
@a
j
g(p(a)) = g
0
(p(a))
@
@a
j
p(a) = g
0
(p(a))
r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
(18)
Combining (16), (17) and (18), we can rewrite (6) as
g
0
(p(a))
r
0
j
(a
j
)
d
0
(p(a))
  f
0
j
(a
j
) < 0 if a
j
> 
j
.
Clearly, this condition is satised if f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; and g(p) are all increasing (recall
that r
j
(a
j
); j = 1; :::; N; are increasing and that d(p) is decreasing).
What remains is to show that only strategies of type (a
1
; :::; a
M
; 
M+1
; :::; 
N
) with
a
j
> 
j
for j = 1; :::;M , where M 2 f1; :::; Ng, can satisfy (9) and (10). This is equivalent to
10
showing that a strategy (a) can never satisfy (9) and (10) if there are j; k 2 f1; :::; Ng so that
j < k, a
j
= 
j
, and a
k
> 
k
. Indeed, (9) and (10) would then imply that f
j
(a
j
)  f
k
(a
k
).
But f
k
(a
k
) is increasing, and hence this would give 
j
+ c
j
= f
j
(a
j
)  f
k
(a
k
) > 
k
+ c
k
,
which contradicts the assumption (see section 4) that 
1
+ c
1
 
2
+ c
2
 :::  
N
+ c
N
.
C Proof of Theorem 1
Applying Lemma 1, it follows that the optimal strategy is the unique strategy that satises
the rst order optimality conditions (9) and (10). Moreover, that strategy has to be of the
type (a
1
; :::; a
M
; 
M+1
; :::; 
N
) with a
j
> 
j
for j = 1; :::;M , where M 2 f1; :::; Ng. Note
that these are exactly the strategies that the procedure considers, starting with M = 1 in
Step 1.
In Steps 2 and 3, for some xed value of M 2 f1; :::; Ng, the strategy that satises (9)
is determined. Since f
j
(a
j
); j = 1; 2; :::;M   1; is increasing, f
j
(
j
) = 
j
+ c
j
 
M
+ c
M
=
f
M
(a
M
) and lim
a
j
!1
f
j
(a
j
) = 1, it follows that for each value of a
M
 
M
there is a
unique value a
j
2 [
j
;1) such that f
j
(a
j
) = f
M
(a
M
). Hence, a
j
; j = 1; 2; :::;M   1; can be
expressed as a function h
M
j
(a
M
), as is done in Step 2. Furthermore, that function h
M
j
(a
M
)
is increasing since both f
j
(a
j
) and f
M
(a
M
) are increasing.
So f
M
(a
M
) and h
M
j
(a
M
); j = 1; 2; :::;M; are all increasing. Since we also have that g(p) is
increasing and that p(a) is decreasing in all a
j
; j = 1; 2; :::;M; (see (14)), it follows that there
is only a single value a

M
for a
M
for which f
M
(a
M
) = g

p

h
M
1
(a
M
); :::; h
M
M
(a
M
); 
M+1
; :::; 
N

.
In Step 4 it is checked whether strategy (h
M
1
(a

M
); :::; h
M
M
(a

M
); 
M+1
; :::; 
N
), that satises
(9), satises (10) also. If so, then it is clear from the rst part of this proof that it is the
optimal strategy. If not, then the procedure tries the next value for M .
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Figure 1: Graphical determination of the prot rate associated with strategy 
0
(a

new
=
6:55) for Example 1.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the acquisition prices, the selling price, and the corresponding
return and demand rates associated with strategies 
0
(a

new
= 6:55) = (a
1
= 5:55; a
2
=
3:55; a
3
= 2) and (a

1
= 5:35; a

2
= 3:85; a

3
= 2) for Example 1. The associated prot rates
are 264.5 and 270.5, respectively.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the acquisition prices, the selling price, and the corresponding
return and demand rates associated with strategies 
0
(a

new
= 1:1) = (a
1
= 0:1; a
2
= 1:55)
and (a

1
= 0:09; a

2
= 1:562) for Example 2. The associated prot rates are 0.99 and 1.36,
respectively.
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